This paper analyses the 3GPP confidentiality and integrity schemes adopted by Universal Mobile Telecommunication System, an emerging standard for third generation wireless communications. The schemes, known as f 8 and f 9, are based on the block cipher KASUMI. Although previous works claim security proofs for f 8 and f 9 , where f 9 is a generalized versions of f 9, it was recently shown that these proofs are incorrect. Moreover, showed that it is impossible to prove f 8 and f 9 secure under the standard PRP assumption on the underlying block cipher. We address this issue here, showing that it is possible to prove f 8 and f 9 secure if we make the assumption that the underlying block cipher is a secure PRP-RKA against a certain class of related-key attacks; here f 8 is a generalized version of f 8. Our results clarify the assumptions necessary in order for f 8 and f 9 to be secure and, since no related-key attacks are known against the full eight rounds of KASUMI, lead us to believe that the confidentiality and integrity mechanisms used in real 3GPP applications are secure.
Introduction
Background. Within the security architecture of the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) system there are two standardized constructions: A confidentiality scheme f 8, and an integrity scheme f 9 [1] . 3GPP is the body standardizing the next generation of mobile telephony. Both f 8 and f 9 are modes of operations based on the block cipher KASUMI [2] . f 8 is a symmetric encryption scheme which is a variant of the Output Feedback (OFB) mode with full feedback, and f 9 is a Message Authentication Code (MAC) which is a variant of the CBC MAC.
Provable Security. Provable security is a standard security goal for block cipher modes of operations. Indeed, many of the block cipher modes of operations are provably secure assuming that the underlying block cipher is a secure pseudorandom permutation, or a super-pseudorandom permutation [21] . For example, we have: CTR mode [3] and CBC encryption mode [3] for symmetric encryption schemes, PMAC [8] and OMAC [14] for message authentication codes, and IAPM [17] , OCB mode [22] , CCM mode [23, 16] , EAX mode [6] and CWC mode [20] for authenticated encryption schemes.
Therefore, it is natural to ask whether f 8 and f 9 are provably secure if the underlying block cipher is a secure pseudorandom permutation. Making this assumption, it was claimed that f 8 is a secure symmetric encryption scheme in the sense of left-or-right indistinguishability [18] and that f 9 is a secure MAC [12] , where f 9 is a generalized version of f 9. However, these claims were disproven [15] . One of the remarkable aspects of f 8 and f 9 is the use of a non-zero constant called a "key modifier," or KM. In the f 8 and f 9 schemes, KASUMI is keyed with K and K ⊕ KM. The paper [15] constructs a secure pseudorandom permutation F with the following property: For any key K, the encryption function with key K is the decryption function with K ⊕ KM. That is, F K (·) = F −1 K⊕KM (·). Then it was shown that f 8 and f 9 are insecure if F is used as the underlying block cipher. This result shows that it is impossible to prove the security of f 8 and f 9 even if the underlying block cipher is a secure pseudorandom permutation.
Our Contribution. Given the results in [15] , it is logical to ask if there are assumptions under which f 8 and f 9 are actually secure and, if so, what those assumptions are. The answers to these questions would give us greater insights into the security of these two modes. Because of the constructions' use of keys related by fixed xor differences, the natural conjecture is that if the constructions are actually secure, then the minimum assumption on the block cipher must be that the block cipher is secure against some class of xor-restricted related-key attacks, as introduced in [7] and formalized in [5] .
We prove that the above hypotheses are in fact correct and, in doing so, we clarify what assumptions are actually necessary in order for the f 8 and f 9 modes to be secure. In more detail, we first consider a generalized version of f 8, which we call f 8 . f 8 is a nonce-based symmetric encryption scheme, and is the natural nonce-based extension of the original f 8. We then show that f 8 is a secure nonce-based deterministic symmetric encryption mode in the sense of indistinguishability from random strings if the underlying block cipher is secure against related-key attacks in which an adversary is able to obtain chosen-plaintext samples of the underlying block cipher using two keys related by a fixed known xor difference.
We next consider a generalized version of f 9, which we call f 9 . f 9 is a deterministic MAC, and is a natural extension of f 9 that gives the user, or adversary, more liberty in controlling the input to the underlying CBC MAC core. We then show that f 9 is a secure pseudorandom function, which provably implies a secure MAC, if the underlying block cipher resists related-key attacks in which an adversary is able to obtain chosen-plaintext samples of the underlying block cipher using two keys related by a fixed known xor difference.
Since both f 8 and f 9 are generalized versions of f 8 and f 9, and, since the best known relatedkey attack against KASUMI breaks only six out of eight rounds [9] , our results show that unless a novel new attack is discovered against KASUMI, the 3GPP confidentiality and integrity mechanisms are actually secure. We view this as an important practical corollary of our research since the 3GPP constructions are destined for use in future mobile telephony applications. Additionally, because our proofs explicitly quantify what properties of the underlying block cipher are necessary in order for f 8 and f 9 to be secure, our results can help others decide whether it is safe to instantiate the generalized 3GPP modes with block ciphers other than KASUMI. Of course, because the assumptions we make are stronger than the standard pseudorandomness assumptions, as proven necessary in [15] , unless there is a significant reason to do otherwise, we suggest that future systems use more conventional modes such as CTR mode and OMAC.
For our proofs, rather than trying to find and re-use correct portions of the analyses in [18] and [12] , we chose instead to prove the security of f 8 and f 9 directly. We did this in order to ensure the correctness of our results and to avoid presenting proofs covered with patches. We discuss some of problems with the previous analyses in more detail in Appendices A.1 and B.1.
An extended abstract of this paper appeared in [13] .
Related Works. Initial security evaluation of KASUMI, f 8 and f 9 can be found in [11] . Knudsen and Mitchell analyzed the security of f 9 against forgery and key recovery attacks [19] .
Preliminaries
Notation. If x is a string then |x| denotes its length in bits. If x and y are two equal-length strings, then x ⊕ y denotes the xor of x and y. If x and y are strings, then x y denotes their concatenation. Let x ← y denote the assignment of y to x. If X is a set, let x R ← X denote the process of uniformly selecting at random an element from X and assigning it to x. If F : {0, 1} k × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m is a family of functions from {0, 1} n to {0, 1} m indexed by keys {0, 1} k , then we use the notation F K (D) as shorthand for F (K, D). We say F is a family of permutations, i.e., a block cipher, if n = m and F K (·) is a permutation on {0, 1} n for each K ∈ {0, 1} k . Let Rand(n, m) denote the set of all functions from {0, 1} n to {0, 1} m . When we refer to the time of an algorithm or experiment in the provable security sections of this paper, we include the size of the code (in some fixed encoding). There is also an implicit big-O surrounding all such time references.
PRP-RKAs. The PRP-RKA notion was introduced in [5] , and is based on the pseudorandomness notions introduced in [21] and later made concrete in [4] . The notion was designed to model block ciphers secure against related-key attacks [7] .
Let Perm(k, n) denote the set of all block ciphers with domain {0, 1} n and keys {0, 1} k . The notation G R ← Perm(k, n) thus corresponds to selecting a random block-cipher, and comes down to defining G via
where Perm(n) is the set of all permutations on {0, 1} n .
Given a family of functions F : {0, 1} k × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n and a key K ∈ {0, 1} k , we define the related-key oracle F rk(·,K) (·) as an oracle that takes two arguments, a function φ : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} k and an element M ∈ {0, 1} n , and that returns F φ(K) (M ), or the encipherment of M under the key φ(K). In this context, we shall refer to φ as a related-key-deriving (RKD) function.
The PRP-RKA notion, which we now describe, is parameterized by a set of RKD functions Φ. Let E : {0, 1} k × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n be a family of functions and let Φ be a set of RKD functions over {0, 1} k . Let A be an adversary with access to a related-key oracle, and restricted to queries of the form (φ, x) in which φ ∈ Φ and x ∈ {0, 1} n , and let A return a bit. Then
is defined as the PRP-RKA-advantage of A in a Φ-restricted related-key attack (RKA) on E. Intuitively, we say that E is a secure PRP-RKA under Φ-restricted related-key attacks if the PRP-RKA-advantage of all adversaries using reasonable resources is small. In this work we are primarily interested in keys that are related by some xor difference. For any ∆ ∈ {0, 1} k we let
We briefly remark that modern block ciphers, e.g., AES [10] , are designed to be secure PRP-RKAs under Φ ⊕ k -restricted relatedkey attacks. Additionally, the best-known Φ ⊕ k -restricted related-key attack against the block cipher KASUMI, which was designed for use with the 3GPP modes, only breaks six out of eight rounds [9] .
3 Specifications of f 8, f 8 , f 9 and f 9
f 8 is a symmetric encryption scheme standardized by 3GPP 1 . It uses a block cipher KASUMI : {0, 1} 128 ×{0, 1} 64 → {0, 1} 64 as the underlying primitive. The f 8 key generation algorithm returns a random 128-bit key K. The f 8 encryption algorithm takes a 128-bit key K, a 32-bit counter COUNT, a 5-bit radio bearer identifier BEARER, a 1-bit direction identifier DIRECTION, and a message M ∈ {0, 1} * to return a ciphertext C, which is the same length as M . Also, it uses a 128-bit constant KM = (01) 64 (or 0x55...55 in hexadecimal) called the key modifier. In more detail, the encryption algorithm is defined as follows: Since we analyze and prove results about a variant of f 8 whose encryption algorithm takes a nonce as input in lieu of COUNT, BEARER, and DIRECTION, we do not describe the specifics of how COUNT, BEARER, and DIRECTION are used in real 3GPP applications. We do note that 3GPP applications will never invoke the f 8 encryption algorithm twice with the same (COUNT, BEARER, DIRECTION) triple, which means that our nonce-based variant is appropriate.
3.2 A Generalized Version of f 8: f 8 f 8 is a nonce-based deterministic symmetric encryption scheme, which is a generalized (and weakened) version of f 8. It uses a block cipher E : {0, 1} k ×{0, 1} n → {0, 1} n as the underlying primitive. Let f 8 [E, ∆] be f 8 , where E is used as the underlying primitive and ∆ is a non-zero k-bit key modifier. The f 8 key generation algorithm returns a random k-bit key K. The f 8 [E, ∆] encryption algorithm, which we call f8 -Encrypt, takes an n-bit nonce N instead of COUNT, BEARER and DIRECTION. That is, the encryption algorithm takes a k-bit key K, an n-bit nonce N , and a message M ∈ {0, 1} * to return a ciphertext C, which is the same length as M . Then the encryption algorithm proceeds as follows:
In the above description, [i − 1] n denotes n-bit binary representation of i − 1. Decryption is done in an obvious way.
Notice that we treat COUNT, BEARER and DIRECTION as a nonce. That is, as we will define in Section 4, we allow the adversary to choose these values. Consequently, f 8 can be considered a weakened version of f 8 since it gives the an adversary the ability to control the entire initial value of A, rather than only a subset of the bits as would be the case for an adversary attacking f 8.
3GPP Integrity Algorithm f 9 [1]
f 9 is a message authentication code standardized by 3GPP. It uses KASUMI as the underlying primitive. The f 9 key generation algorithm returns a random 128-bit key K. The f 9 tagging algorithm takes a 128-bit key K, a 32-bit counter COUNT, a 32-bit random number FRESH, a 1-bit direction identifier DIRECTION, and a message M ∈ {0, 1} * and returns a 32-bit tag T . It uses a 128-bit constant KM = (10) 64 (or 0xAA...AA in hexadecimal), called the key modifier.
Let
is 64 bits. The last block M [m] may have fewer than 64 bits. We define pad 64 (COUNT, FRESH, DIRECTION, M ) as follows: It concatenates COUNT, FRESH, M and DIRECTION, and then appends a single "1" bit, followed by between 0 and 63 "0" bits so that the total length is a multiple of 64 bits. More precisely,
Then the tagging algorithm is defined as follows:
The f 9 verification algorithm is defined in the natural way.
As with f 8, since we analyze and prove the security of a generalized version of f 9, we do not describe how COUNT, FRESH, and DIRECTION are used in real 3GPP applications.
A Generalized Version of f 9: f 9 [12, 19, 15]
The message authentication code f 9 is a generalized (and weakened) version of f 9 that gives the user (or adversary) almost complete control over the input the underlying CBC MAC core. It uses a block cipher E : {0,
where E is used as the underlying block cipher, ∆ is a non-zero k-bit key modifier, and the tag length is l, where 1 ≤ l ≤ n. The key generation algorithm returns a random k-bit key K. The tagging algorithm, which we call f9 -Tag, takes a k-bit key K and a message M ∈ {0, 1} * as input and returns an l-bit tag T .
is n bits. The last block M [m] may have fewer than n bits. In f 9 , we use pad n instead of pad 64 . pad n (M ) works as follows: It simply appends a single "1" bit, followed by between 0 and n − 1 "0" bits so that the total length is a multiple of n bits. More precisely,
Thus, we simply ignore COUNT, FRESH, and DIRECTION. Equivalently, we consider COUNT, FRESH, and DIRECTION as a part of the message. The rest of the tagging algorithm is the same as with f 9. In pseudocode,
The verification algorithm is defined in the natural way.
As we will define in Section 5, our adversary is allowed to choose COUNT, FRESH, and DI-RECTION since f 9 treats them as a part of the message. In this sense, f 9 can be considered as a weakened version of f 9.
Security of f 8
Definitions. Before proving the security of f 8 , we must first formally define what we mean by a nonce-based encryption scheme, and what it means for such an encryption scheme to be secure.
Mathematically, a nonce-based symmetric encryption scheme SE = (K, E, D) consists of three algorithms and is defined for some nonce length n. The randomized key generation algorithm K takes no input and returns a random key K. The stateless and deterministic encryption algorithm takes a key K, an nonce N ∈ {0, 1} n , and a message M ∈ {0, 1} * as input and returns a ciphertext C such that |C| = |M |; we write C ← E K (N, M ). The stateless and deterministic decryption algorithm takes a key K, a nonce N ∈ {0, 1} n , and a ciphertext C ∈ {0, 1} * as input and returns a message M such that |M | = |C|; we write M ← D K (N, C). For consistency, we require that for all keys K, nonces N , and messages M ,
We adopt the strong notion of privacy for nonce-based encryption schemes from [22] . This notion, which we call indistinguishability from random strings, provably implies the more standard notions given in [3] . Let $(·, ·) denote an oracle that on input a pair of strings (N, M ) returns a random string of length |M |. If A is an adversary with access to an oracle, then
is defined as the PRIV-advantage of A in distinguishing the outputs of the encryption algorithm with a randomly selected key from random strings. We say that A is nonce-respecting if it never queries its oracle twice with the same nonce value. Intuitively, we say that an encryption scheme preserves privacy under chosen-plaintext attacks if the PRIV-advantage of all nonce-respecting adversaries A using reasonable resources is small.
Provable Security Results. Let p8
[n] be a variant of f 8 that uses random functions on n-bits instead of E K and E K⊕∆ . Specifically, the key generation algorithm for p8 [n] returns two randomly selected functions R 1 , R 2 from Rand(n, n). The encryption algorithm for p8 [n], p8 -Encrypt, takes R 1 and R 2 as "keys" and uses them instead of E K and E K⊕∆ . The decryption algorithm is defined in the natural way. We first upper-bound the advantage of an adversary in breaking the privacy of p8 [n]. Let (N i , M i ) denote a privacy adversary's i-th oracle query. If the adversary makes exactly q oracle queries, then we define the total number of blocks for the adversary's queries as σ =
Lemma 4.1 Let p8 [n] be as described above and let A be a nonce-respecting privacy adversary which asks at most q queries totaling at most σ blocks. Then
A proof is given in Appendix A. We now present our main result for f 8 (Theorem 4.1 below). At a high level, our theorem shows that if a block cipher E is secure against Φ-restricted related key attacks, where Φ is a small subset of Φ ⊕ k , then the construction f 8 [E, ∆] based on E will be a provably secure encryption scheme. In more detail, our theorem states that given any adversary A attacking the privacy of f 8 [E, ∆] and making at most q oracle queries totaling at most σ blocks, we can construct a Φ-restricted PRP-RKA adversary B attacking E such that B uses similar resources as A and B has advantage Adv Since many block ciphers, including AES and KASUMI, are believed to resist Φ ⊕ k -restricted related-key attacks, and since Φ is a small subset of Φ ⊕ k , this theorem means that f 8 constructions built from these block ciphers will be provably secure. Additionally, because Φ is a small subset of Φ ⊕ k , the f 8 construction actually requires a much weaker assumption on the underlying block cipher than resistance to the full class of Φ ⊕ k -restricted related-key attacks, meaning that it is more likely for the underlying block cipher to resist Φ-restricted related-key attacks than Φ ⊕ k -restricted related-key attacks. Of course, our results also suggest that if a block cipher is known to be insecure under Φ-restricted related-key attacks, that block cipher should not be used in the f 8 construction.
Since f 8 is a weakened version of the KASUMI-based f 8 encryption scheme, and since KASUMI is currently believed to resist Φ ⊕ k -restricted related-key attacks, our result shows that f 8 as designed for use in the 3GPP protocols is secure.
Our main theorem statement for f 8 is given below. 
Furthermore, B makes at most σ + q oracle queries and uses the same time as A.
Proof . Let f8 -Encrypt denote the encryption algorithm for f 8 [E, ∆] and let p8 -Encrypt denote the encryption algorithm for p8 [n] . Expanding the definition of Adv 
Applying Lemma 4.1 we get
Let B be a Φ-restricted related-key adversary against E that runs A and that returns the same bit that A returns. Let F rk(·,K) (·) denote B's related-key oracle. When A makes an oracle query (N, M ) to its oracle, B essentially computes the f8 -Encrypt algorithm, except that it uses its related-key oracle in place of E K and E K⊕∆ . In pseudocode,
Run A, replying to A's oracle queries (N, M ) as follows:
We now observe that
since B, when given related-key oracle access to E with a randomly selected key K, responds to A exactly as the f8 -Encrypt K (·, ·) oracle would respond with a randomly selected key K. Let Rand(k, n, n) denote the set of all functions from {0, 1} k × {0, 1} n to {0, 1} n . Then the equation
follows from the fact that when G is randomly selected from Rand(k, n, n), regardless of the key K and since we assume ∆ = 0 k , G K and G K⊕∆ are both randomly selected functions from Rand(n, n).
Combining the above equations, we have that
Using the PRP-RKA definition and applying a variant of the PRF/PRP switching lemma from [5] , we get
For the application of the PRF/PRP switching lemma, we note that B queries its related-key oracle with the RKD function id at most σ times and the RKD function XOR ∆ at most q times. Rearranging the above equation and simplifying gives (2), as desired. Q.E.D.
Security of f 9
Definitions. Before proving the security of f 9 , we must first formally define what we mean by a MAC, and what it means for a MAC to be secure. Mathematically, a message authentication scheme or MAC MA = (K, T , V) consists of three algorithms and is defined for some tag length l. The randomized key generation algorithm K takes no input and returns a random key K. The stateless and deterministic tagging algorithm takes a key K and a message M ∈ {0, 1} * as input and returns a tag T ∈ {0, 1} l ; we write T ← T K (M ). The stateless and deterministic verification algorithm takes a key K, a message M ∈ {0, 1} * , and a candidate tag T ∈ {0, 1} l as input and returns a bit b; we write b ← V K (M, T ). For consistency, we require that for all keys K and messages M ,
For security, we adopt a strong notion of security for MACs, namely pseudorandomness (PRF). In [4] it was proven that if a MAC is secure PRF, then it is also unforgeable. If A is an adversary with access to an oracle, then
is defined as the PRF-advantage of A in distinguishing the outputs of the tagging algorithm with a randomly selected key from the outputs of a random function with the same domain and range. Intuitively, we say that a message authentication code is pseudorandom or secure if the PRFadvantage of all adversaries A using reasonable resources is small.
Provable Security Results. Let p9
[n] be a variant of f 9 that always outputs a full n-bit tag and that uses random functions on n-bits instead of E K and E K⊕∆ . Specifically, the key generation algorithm for p9 [n] returns two randomly selected functions R 1 , R 2 from Rand(n, n). The tagging algorithm for p9 [n], p9 -Tag, takes R 1 and R 2 as "keys" and uses them instead of E K and E K⊕∆ . The verification algorithm is defined in the natural way. We first upper-bound the advantage of an adversary in attacking the pseudorandomness of p9 [n]. Let M i denote an adversary's i-th oracle query. If an adversary makes exactly q oracle queries, then we define the total number of blocks for the adversary's queries as σ =
Lemma 5.1 Let p9 [n] be as described above and let A be an adversary which asks at most q queries totaling at most σ blocks. Then
A proof is given in Appendix B. We now present our main result for f 9 (Theorem 5.1), which we interpret as follows: our theorem shows that if a block cipher E is secure against Φ-restricted related-key attacks, where Φ is a small subset of Φ ⊕ k , then the construction f 9 [E, ∆, l] based on E will be a provably secure message authentication code. In more detail, we show that given any adversary A attacking f 9 [E, ∆, l] and making at most q oracle queries totaling at most σ blocks, we can construct a Φ-restricted PRP-RKA adversary B against E such that B uses similar resources as A and B has advantage Adv prp-rka Φ,E (B) ≥ Adv prf f 9 [E,∆,l] (A)−(3q 2 +2σ 2 +2σq)/2 n+1 . If we assume that E is secure against Φ-restricted related-key attacks and that A (and therefore B) uses reasonable resources, then Adv prp-rka Φ,E (B) must be small by definition. Therefore Adv prf f 9 [E,∆,l] (A) must be small as well, proving that under these assumptions on E, f 9 [E, ∆, l] is secure.
Since many block ciphers, including AES and KASUMI, are believed to resist Φ ⊕ k -restricted related-key attacks, and since Φ is a small subset of Φ ⊕ k , this theorem means that f 9 constructions built from these block ciphers will be provably secure. Furthermore, because f 9 is a weakened version of the KASUMI-based f 9 message authentication code, our result shows that f 9 as designed for use in the 3GPP protocols is secure.
The precise theorem statement is as follows: Proof . We first note that given any PRF adversary A against f 9 [E, ∆, l], we can construct a PRF adversary C against f 9 [E, ∆, n] such that the following equation holds
This standard result follows from the fact that the extra bits provided to the adversary can only improve its chance of success. Our approach to upper-bounding Adv 
As with the proof of Lemma 5.1, let B be a Φ-restricted related-key adversary against E that runs C and that returns the same bit that C returns. Let F rk(·,K) (·) denote B's related-key oracle. This time, when C makes an oracle query (N, M ) to its oracle, B essentially computes the f9 -Tag algorithm, except that it uses its related-key oracle in place of E K and E K⊕∆ . In pseudocode,
Run C, replying to C's oracle queries M as follows:
We first observe that when B is given related-key oracle access to E with key K, it replies to C's oracle queries exactly as f9 -Tag K (·) does. This means that the following equation holds:
We also observe that when B is given related-key oracle access to G with key K, where G is a randomly selected function family from Rand(k, n, n), the functions G K (·) and G K⊕∆ (·) are both randomly selected from Rand(n, n). This means that B replies to C's oracle queries exactly as p9 -Tag R 1 ,R 2 (·) would with two randomly selected functions R 1 , R 2 from Rand(n, n). Consequently, the following equation holds:
Combining these equations, we have that
Applying the PRP-RKA definition and a variant of the PRF/PRP switching lemma from [5] , we get
For the application of the PRF/PRP switching lemma, we note that B queries its related-key oracle with the RKD function id at most σ + q times and the RKD function XOR ∆ at most q times. Combining the above with equation (5) 
. . , C q be fixed bit strings such that
. . , C q satisfy the following condition:
(there is no condition on
For (N i , M i ) and functions R 1 and R 2 , let A i = R 1 (N i ), and
We first show the following lemma. q, m 1 , . . . , m q , σ, N 1 , . . . , N q , M 1 , . . . , M q , C 1 , . . . , C q be as described above. Then 
Lemma A.1 Let
We say that BAD[t] occurs if at least one of the above (t − 1) conditions occurs.
Intuitively, Cond. A-s (1 ≤ s ≤ t) ensure that currently fixed X t is different from all the previously fixed X 1 , . . . , X t−1 . Notice that, from the condition on C i in (6), there is no collision among the elements in X t . For any A t , X t has m t distinct elements.
We upper bound the probability of BAD[t] (1 ≤ t ≤ q). Now we see that
since there are exactly m s elements in X s and exactly m t elements in X t , and these elements collide with probability 2 −n because of the randomness of A t . Therefore,
Now the left hand side of (7) is lower bounded by
since, if none of BAD[t] occurs, then X 1 ∪ · · · ∪ X q has σ distinct elements, and thus R 2 has σ distinct inputs. Then, (8) is lower bounded by
Finally, we have
and the lemma follows.
Q.E.D.
We now prove Lemma 4.1.
Proof (of Lemma 4.1). Let
The adversary A has oracle access to O(·, ·). Since A is computationally unbounded, there is no loss of generality to assume that A is deterministic. Also, there is no loss of generality to assume that A makesueries, and the length of each queries is a multiple of n bits. For the i-th query A makes to O(·, ·), define the query-answer pair (N i , M i , C i ), where A's query was (N i , M i ) and the answer it got was C i .
Suppose that we run A with the oracle O(·, ·). For this run, we define view v of A as
Since A is deterministic, the i-th query A makes is fully determined by the first i − 1 query-answer pairs. This implies that if we fix some σn-bit string V and return the i-th m i blocks as the answer for the i-th query A makes (instead of the oracle), then
• the unique parsing of V into the format defined in (9) is determined, and
• the final output of A (0 or 1) is uniquely determined.
We note that since A is nonce-respecting, the corresponding N 1 , . . . , N q are distinct.
Let V one be a set of all σn-bit strings V such that A outputs 1, and let N one def = #V one . Also, let V good be a set of all σn-bit strings V such that the corresponding parsing satisfies (6) , and let Then we have
Next define
Then from Lemma A.1, we have
We next count N good . Suppose that the message of A's first query (N 1 , M 1 ) has m 1 blocks. Then the first n bits of V can take any value except for
n , the second n bits of V can take any
n , the third n bits of V can take any value except for
n , and so on.
In particular, at most j values are not allowed for the j-th block (1 ≤ j ≤ m 1 − 1), and the m 1 -th block can take any value. That is, the first m 1 blocks of V can take at least
values. When we choose one of the above 2 m 1 n 1 − 
2 (σ−(m 1 +···+m q ))n is multiplied since, in case of σ > m 1 +· · ·+m q , the remaining (σ−(m 1 +· · ·+m q )) bits can take any value. Then we have
2 n+1 , and (11) is lower bounded by
From (10) we have
Applying the same argument to 1 − p real and 1 − p rand yields that
Finally, (12) and (13) give
A.1 Discussion of the Previous Work [18] [18, p. 269, Lemma 7] might be seen to correspond to Lemma 4.1. However, there is a problem with the definition of their encryption scheme. Their encryption scheme, which we call p8 [n], is described as follows: The key generation algorithm for p8 [n] returns a randomly selected permutation P 1 from Perm(n). The encryption algorithm for p8 [n] takes P 1 as a "key" and uses P 1 and P 2 instead of E K and E K⊕∆ , but it is not defined how P 2 is derive from P 1 . We note that [12, p. 166, Lemma 2] has a similar problem, which is described in Appendix B.1. We also adopt the strong notion of privacy, indistinguishability from random strings [22] . This security notion is strictly stronger than the left-or-right indistinguishability used in [18, p. 269, Lemma 7] .
We present the full security proof for p8 [n] in order to achieve this strong security notion and to establish self contained security proof.
B Proof of Lemma 5.1
To prove Lemma 5.1, we define p9 -E[n], a variant of p9 [n] . The tagging algorithm for p9 -E[n] takes only messages of length multiple of n, and it does not perform the final encryption. Specifically, the key generation algorithm for p9 -E[n] returns a randomly selected function R 1 from Rand(n, n). The tagging algorithm for p9 -E[n], p9 -E-Tag, takes R 1 as a "key" and a message M such that |M | = mn for some m ≥ 1. In pseudocode:
The verification algorithm is defined in the natural way. 
We first show the following lemma. q, m 1 , . . . , m q , σ, M 1 , . . . , M q be as described above. Then 
Lemma B.1 Let
since we have
choice of (i, i ). Therefore,
Now the left hand side of (14) 
Proof . The left hand side of (16) is at least
since, if there is no collision among the outputs of p9 -E-Tag R 1 (·), then R 2 has q distinct inputs. From Lemma B.1, the lemma follows. Q.E.D.
We now prove Lemma 5.1.
Proof (of Lemma 5.1).
Let O(·) be either p9 -Tag R 1 ,R 2 (·) or g(·). The adversary A has oracle access to O(·). Since A is computationally unbounded, there is no loss of generality to assume that A is deterministic. Also, there is no loss of generality to assume that A makesueries. 
Since A is deterministic, the i-th query A makes is fully determined by the first i − 1 query-answer pairs. This implies that if we fix some qn-bit string V and return the i-th n-bit block as the answer for the i-th query A makes (instead of the oracle), then
• A's queries (M 1 , . . . , M q ) are uniquely determined, and
We note that since A never repeats a query, M 1 , . . . , M q are distinct.
Let V one be a set of all qn-bit strings V such that A outputs 1, and let N one Then from Lemma B.2, we have
From (18) we have
Finally, (19) and (20) There is a problem with the definition of their MAC. Their MAC, which we call p9 [n], is described as follows: the key generation algorithm for p9 [n] returns a randomly selected permutation P 1 from Perm(n). The tagging algorithm for p9 [n] takes P 1 as a "key" and uses P 1 and P 2 instead of E K and E K⊕∆ , and outputs a full n-bit tag, where P 2 ∈ Perm(n) \ {P 1 } is determined from P 1 by some means. The verification algorithm is defined in the natural way. Then [12, p. 159 ] says the security of p9 [n] does not depend on how P 2 is derived from P 1 , which is not correct. For example if P 2 is chosen as P 2 = P −1 1 , then it is easy to make a forgery.
We present the full security proof for p9 [n] in order to avoid presenting proof covered with patches, and to establish self contained security proof.
